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Abstract: Recently Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1995) have provided
a popular support for progressivity theorem that says that a marginal progres-
sive tax always defeats a marginal regressive tax as long as individuals vote
for the tax scheme minimizing their tax liabilities and the median income is
less than the mean income. In this paper we provide, under similar circum-
stances, a popular support for regressivity theorem a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hm o r e
marginal regressivity (or less marginal progressivity) can always defeat any
existing tax scheme. This move towards more regressivity (or less progressiv-
ity) is supported by the extremes of the income distribution. Combining this
result with Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin￿ result implies that vote cycling
is inevitable and that the demand for progressivity cannot be established in
t h es t a n d a r dD o w n s i a nf r a m e w o r kw i t hs e l f - i n t e r e s t e dv o t e r s .
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Optimal taxation cannot explain the apparent demand for progressivity in
developped countries. Indeed, tax policies derived from some social welfare
optimization can be either (marginal) progressive or regressive (see Myles,
2000). However, if we agree that voters care about the fairness of taxation
rather than maximizing social welfare, then Young (1990) has shown that
equal sacri￿ce implies progressiveness. But such arguments typically fail
if voters are self-interested. Adopting the Downsian framework, with two-
party without ideology competing to win the election and self-interested
voters, both Snyder and Kramer (1988) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1991)
obtain the existence of a Condorcet winner involving progressive taxation,
but only under rather strong and mainly unjusti￿able conditions.1
The main reason why the Downsian approach has failed to explain the ob-
served democratic demand for progressivity is that voting over non-linear
income tax policies requires a policy space that is at least two-dimensional.
Therefore we cannot put the alternatives in a transitive order and we do
not generally expect to get Condorcet winner. It follows that any tax policy
could be defeated by at least one other policy. Recently, Marhuenda and
Ortuno-Ortin (1995) have suggested one interesting way out. They consider
simple voting over two tax schemes: an arbitrary status quo and an amend-
ment. This formulation avoids the diﬃculties of multi-dimensional voting
and still retains the essential aspects of majority voting over tax policies.
Moreover this formulation enables them to obtain interesting insights on the
democratic demand for progressivity. Indeed they obtain the remarkable re-
sult that any marginal progressive tax wins over any regressive one provided
that the median is less than the mean income. This popular support for pro-
gressivity theorem is obtained with self-interested voters who vote for the
tax policy that taxes them less. 2
The purpose of this paper is to present under similar circumstances a popu-
l a rs u p p o r tf o rr e g r e s s i v i t yt h e o r e maccording to which any tax scheme can
be defeated by a less marginal progressive (or more marginal regressive) tax
scheme supported by a majority of the extremes. Combining this regressiv-
1For instance Snyder and Kramer (1988) reduce the policy space to tax schemes that
are preferred by some voters.
2The result has been generalized by Mitra et al (1998) to more sophisticated voters
who also care about their relative position in the income distribution.
1ity theorem with the progressivity theorem establishes the inevitable voting
cycle Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin were trying to escape.3
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a one good economy (consumption) populated by a large num-
ber of individuals who diﬀer only in their income levels. Each individual is
characterized by her ￿xed income level, y ∈ Ω =[ 0 ,Y]. (Thus the highest
income level in the economy is Y .) The distribution of income in the popu-
lation is described by a strictly increasing distribution function F on [0,Y],
so that F(y) is the fraction of the population with pre-tax income less or
equal to y.T h e mean income is y =
R
Ω ydF(y)a n dt h emedian income is
ym = F−1(1/2). We assume throughout that ym ≤ y. The tax liability of
an individual with pre-tax income y is t(y)w h e r et : Ω → R is a continuous
tax function satisfying the following feasibility conditions:
t(y) ≤ y for all y ∈ [0,Y]( 1 )
Z
Ω
t(y)dF(y)=0 ( 2 )
Condition (1) says that tax liabilities cannot exceed taxable income. Condi-
tion (2) is merely a budget balance condition with zero revenue requirement
(i.e., purely redistributive taxation).
Voting over both progressive and regressive tax schemes requires a policy
space that is at least two-dimensional. In the following we shall consider
quadratic income taxes of the form:
t(y)=−c + by + ay2, (3)
where c ≥ 0 is the uniform lump-sum transfer, b is the linear tax parameter
(with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1), and a>0( < 0) is the progressivity (regressivity) tax
parameter. Let X be the set of quadratic tax functions that satisfy the
feasibility conditions (1) and (2). Using the budget balance condition (2),
we can express c as a function of a and b:
c = by + ay2
= by + a(y2 + σ2). (4)
3We should note that Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin make in fact allusion to this pos-
sibility in their conclusion.
2where y2 =
R
Ω y2 dF(y)a n dσ2 = y2 − y2 is the variance of the income
distribution. So, tax policies are two-dimensional, (a,b).
Democratic countries typically rely on political parties to select a small
subset of the possible ￿scal policies, and then only this small selected set
of ￿scal policies will be considered by the voters in the general election.
Let us consider a simple model of how political parties select ￿scal poli-
cies. For simplicity, we also assume here that there are only two political
parties without ideology who simply wish to win the election by selecting a
￿scal policy preferred by a majority to the one selected by the other party.
They must choose their policy simultaneously and independently. This is
the standard Downsian majority voting game. Let P denote the majority
preference relation. Assuming an odd number of voters, the majority pref-
erence P is a binary relation satisfying the asymmetry and completeness
properties of a tournament. Supposing that voters are simply voting for the
tax scheme that taxes them less, the majority preference relation over any
tax pair (t1,t 2) ∈ X2 is given by,
t1Pt2 : n(t1,t 2) >n (t2,t 1)
t2Pt1 : n(t1,t 2) <n (t2,t 1),
where n(t1,t 2)=# {y ∈ [0,Y]:t1(y) ≤ t2(y)} is the number of voters who
(weakly) prefer t1 to t2,a n dn(t2,t 1)=# {y ∈ [0,Y]:t1(y) >t 2(y)} is the
number of voters who prefer t2 to t1.
I ft h et w op a r t i e sc h o o s ed i ﬀerent ￿scal policies, then the one which
selects the policy preferred by a majority of voters wins the election. Oth-
erwise, each party wins with probability 1/2. Considering that each party
is only interested to win and can choose among the same set of admissi-









This game, called the majority game, has a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies if and only if there exists a Condorcet winner, that is a pol-
icy t∗ ∈ X such that t∗Pt for all t ∈ X\{t∗}. But because the set of policy
alternatives is bi-dimensional, we cannot put the alternatives in a transitive
order and we do not generally expect to get a Condorcet winner. This is
3exactly what we are going to prove. For any (positively skewed) income
distribution, there is no Condorcet winner and any policy could be defeated
by at least one other policy (either more or less progressive). Note that this
is for a reduced policy space involving only quadratic tax functions, and
thus, a fortiori it must be true for more general continuous tax schemes. It
f o l l o w st h a tt h eg a m ec a n n o th a v ea n ye q u i l i b r i ai np u r es t r a t e g i e s ,b e c a u s e
each party could win the election if it knew which policy would be chosen
by the other party.
We establish the inevitable voting cycle by means of two propositions. Propo-
sition 1 states that any feasible quadratic tax scheme t2 ∈ X can be defeated
under a majority coalition of the extremes by a less progressive (or more re-
gressive) feasible tax scheme t1 ∈ X. Then Proposition 2 states that any
feasible quadratic tax scheme t2 ∈ X can be defeated under a majority coali-
tion of the poor and middle class by a more progressive (or less regressive)
feasible tax scheme t1 ∈ X. Of course Proposition 2 is a simple restatement
to quadratic tax schemes of Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin￿ popular support
for progressivity theorem.
3 Inevitable voting cycle
To prove Proposition 1 we need the following Lemma which makes precise
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for any tax scheme to be defeated by
a less progressive one.
Lemma: Suppose income is ￿xed and distributed according to F(y) in
[0,Y],w i t hym ≤ y. Then for any tax scheme t2 = −c2 + b2y + a2y2 there
exists a less progressive tax scheme t1 = −c1 + b1y + a1y2 with a1 <a 2 ,

















(α − 1)2y2 + σ2 ∈ [0,Y]
(C) α > 1
2 + σ2
2y2
Proof: Consider the two tax schedules: t1 = −c1 + b1y + a1y2 and
t2 = −c2+b2y+a2y2 and let T = t1−t2 = −c+by+ay2 with a = a1−a2 < 0,
b = b1 − b2 > 0, and c = c1 − c2 > 0. From the budget balance constraint,







with y∗ = − b
2a and b2+4ac > 0. Therefore, all those with income y ∈ [y1,y 2]
are paying more taxes under t1 and all those outside this interval pay less
taxes under t1.N o w￿x y∗ = αy with α > 0; that is the interval [y1,y 2]i s
centered around αy. It follows that b = −2aαy and thus we get4,
(y1,y 2)=αy –
q
(α − 1)2y2 + σ2











(α − 1)2y2 + σ2
¶
< 1/2
which is condition (A) of the proposition. Furthermore (y1,y 2) ∈ [0,Y]o n l y
if Condition (B) of the proposition is satis￿ed. Finally using b = −2aαy,
the requirement c>0 is equivalent to








which is Condition (C) in the proposition. QED.
Using this Lemma we can now prove the following proposition,
Proposition 1: Suppose income is ￿x e da n dd i s t r i b u t e da c c o r d i n gt o
F(y) in [0,Y],w i t hym < y and Y large enough. Then for any tax scheme
t2 = −c2 + b2y + a2y2 there exists a less progressive tax scheme t1 =
−c1 + b1y + a1y2 with a1 <a 2 , b1 >b 2 and c1 >c 2 such that t1Pt2.
Proof:L e tu s￿x α s ot h a tt h el o w e rb o u n do ft h ei n t e r v a l[ y1,y 2]c o -
incides with ym (with ym < y), and then conditon (A) is automatically
satis￿ed since necessarily more than half of voters would fall below the in-
terval. Formally, set α > 0s u c ht h a t
ym = αy −
q
(α − 1)2y2 + σ2
4Using b = −2aαy and c = by + a(y
2 + σ
2)w eh a v eb


















2] > 0 for all α > 0
5or equivalently
(α − 1)y +(y − ym)=
q
(α − 1)2y2 + σ2









where s =( y−ym)/σ > 0 denotes the measure of skewness (with 0 <s≤ 1)
a n dw eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a ty −ym = sσ. It can be checked that Condi-
tion (C) is automatically satis￿ed for this value of α. Lastly Condition (B)
is met for any s>0 provided that Y is large enough. QED
Notice that this result holds true regardless of the form of the probability
distribution function F(y), provided that the median is less than the mean
income.5 The result is not trivial because the curvature of the tax function
aﬀects the intercept, and the distribution of income in￿uences the length of
the interval [y1,y 2]: the lower the probability mass around y (always con-
tained in the interval) the longer the interval.
The next proposition, adapted from Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1995),
establishes the inevitable voting cycle.
Proposition 2 : Suppose income is ￿xed and distributed according to
F(y) in [0,Y],w i t hym ≤ y. Then for any tax scheme t2 = −c2+b2y+a2y2
there exists a more progressive tax scheme t1 = −c1+b1y+a1y2 with a1 >a 2,
b1 < (>)b2 and c1 >c 2 such that t1Pt2.
Proof: Consider the two tax schedules t1 = −c1 + b1y + a1y2 and t2 =
−c2 +b2y +a2y2 and let T = t1 −t2 = −c+by +ay2 with a = a1 −a2 > 0,
b = b1 − b2 < (>)0, and c = c1 − c2 > 0. From the balanced budget
constraint, we have c = by + ay2. Clearly, T is convex with a negative










So, T(y) < 0 and since T is strictly convex, T must be strictly increasing
5In fact, it can be shown that the result fails for symmetric distributions like the
uniform or the triangular ones. Proof of this statement is available upon request.
6and therefore T(y) < 0 for all y ∈ [0,y], that is all those with income below
t h em e a ni n c o m ep a yl e s st a x e su n d e rt1 than under t2.S i n c eym ≤ y more
than half the voters would prefer t1 to t2 and the result follows. QED
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have supplemented the popular support for progressivity
theorem of Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1995) with a novel popular sup-
port for regressivity theorem to establish the inevitable voting cycle over tax
policies. There are three possible solutions to this diﬃculty. Firstly we can
abandon the Downsian assumption that parties are only interested to win
election, but the problem is that the Condorcet winner may not be selected
if it exists. Secondly, we can keep the Downsian approach but adopt al-
ternative solution concepts that are Condorcet consistent in the sense that
they will pick the Condorcet winner if any as the unique outcome of the
game (examples of such solution concepts are the uncovered set,the mini-
mal covering set, the Bipartisan set and the Banks set)6.T h i r d l y w e c a n
adopt alternative rules for the voting game. For instance we can consider
issue-by-issue voting or sequential voting. The ￿rst approach has been car-
ried out forcefully by Roemer (1999). The two other approaches have been
investigated among other by De Donder and Hindriks (2000).
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